1. Argentina (Counter)
Milei above the melee. Argentine president Javier Milei has given Argentina its first budget surplus in years, but it has come at a cost. Unable to strike a deal to raise taxes, the self-styled “anarcho-capitalist” has instead had to cut deals with the political class to make deep and unpopular budget cuts, resulting in ongoing demonstrations and a general strike. You wouldn’t know it if you looked at his approval rating.
Milei’s net approval rating remains in solidly positive territory even as tens of thousands of Argentines take to the streets. While public support has declined since his inauguration (a common effect as the shine wears off of new leaders), Milei remains one of the most popular leaders in our Global Leader Approval Tracker, coming in behind only India’s Narendra Modi (data is current as of May 7).
If we break out Milei’s approval rating into its component shares, we see that while his overall approval remains quite high, its intensity has declined. The share of Argentines who say they “strongly approve” of Milei’s job performance has declined by 14 percentage points since January 1, while those who say they only “somewhat approve” has risen 8 points. The share who say they “strongly disapprove,” meanwhile, has ticked up 7 points, reaching a tracking high this month of roughly 25%.
On the one hand, it is somewhat shocking that Milei has thus far managed to retain such high levels of support amid public outcry and painful budget cuts. On the other hand, Argentines are understandably fed up with sky-high inflation, which has been brutally eroding their buying power in recent months. Milei’s early success at getting it in hand has insulated him from greater general discontent. If inflation continues to come down and he exhibits ongoing pragmatism, we expect support for Milei will tick down over time, but remain positive in the near term. If inflation spikes again, Argentines will stop giving Milei the benefit of the doubt.
2. Russia-China Relations (Counter)
Each unhappy friendship… Ahead of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s anticipated visit to Beijing later this week — when discussion of the war in Ukraine will presumably be on the table — Chinese favorability toward Russia (first chart below) has reverted to pre-war levels and is currently hovering near tracking lows. Russian views of China, meanwhile, remain substantially above pre-war levels (second chart below).
The countervailing trends we see in our data speak to a potential mismatch in public assessments of the value of both countries’ oft-declared “no-limits friendship” more than two years into the conflict. For Russia, which continues to benefit from Chinese material support for its war efforts, persistently favorable views of Beijing make sense. For China, whose actions on this front raised Washington’s ire in April, worsening views may reflect growing public recognition that Beijing’s support for Russia could increasingly have consequences in other domains (i.e. U.S.-China relations) that matter more.
To be sure, bilateral sentiment remains broadly favorable on a net basis even after the recent deterioration in Chinese views. And in countries whose media landscapes are dominated by state-run entities, the government itself often has a hand in driving public views. That throws into sharper relief the possibility that the mismatch we observe at the level of public opinion reflects a mismatch in foreign policy priorities at the level of government.
3. Global Views of Israel (Counter)
Big reputation. Israel’s global reputation — severely damaged by the initiation of the land incursion into Gaza late last year — is holding steady ahead of its anticipated invasion of Rafah. While Israel’s plans on this front have been widely criticized in diplomatic circles, including by Washington and Downing Street, we have seen little passthrough to public sentiment to date: Per the chart below, global average net favorability toward Israel across the 42 countries where we track the metric is largely holding steady at present.
When taking a longer-term view of the conflict, the situation is not especially rosy. Israel’s favorability abroad is pinned near tracking lows and, should the invasion proceed, would likely take an additional hit. But given the limited movement we’ve observed on this front in the first half of May, we expect the magnitude of any future downtrend in public opinion to be relatively muted compared with the roughly 25 point drop we saw from September-November 2023 (bookending the onset of the conflict). Further diplomatic rifts may be imminent post-invasion, but in contrast to some recent analyses, global public opinion may not pose much more of a constraint on Israeli behavior afterwards than it already has to date.
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